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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS COMPLETELY IGNORE CLEAR STATUTORY 
AND CASE AUTHORITY 
Defendants offer no basis for their argument that Plaintiff has not met the four part 
test for a private cause of action. Rather Defendants ignore relevant case law cited by 
Plaintiff and simply assert that the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") has only one 
purpose - providing income to injured workers. Defendants inexplicably ignore those 
Utah cases and provisions of the Act that detail the importance of health care and 
treatment for injured workers. Defendants have been relegated to calling Plaintiff a 
"pharmacy collection agency" in an attempt to disparage Plaintiff and obfuscate the very 
real fact that most injured workers would not be able to get their medications from 
pharmacies without Plaintiffs services unless the injured worker was able to pay cash out 
of pocket. 
Defendants do not even address the 2003 amendments to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-
2-407(12) (2003), 34A-2-801(l)(c) (2003), which removed the term "surgeon or other 
health provider" from Title 34A, Section 2, and replaced it with the term "physician." 
Instead, Defendants attempt to misapply the exclusive remedy provision of the Act 
relating to the wage compensation in misinterpreting Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105. This 
exclusive remedy provision only concerns "compensation" and does not refer to 
reimbursement for medical benefits and medicines. Compensation is defined as "the 
payments and benefits provided for in [the Act]." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(3) 
(2005). The Workers' Compensation Act clearly distinguishes between the right to 
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recover compensation and the right to receive reimbursement for medical benefits and 
medicines. Section 34A-2-418 provides, in relevant part, 
In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter . . . , the employer 
or the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial means, appliances, and 
prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418(l) (2005) (emphasis added). The distinction between 
compensation and medical benefits is further supported by Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401, 
which provides, in relevant part, 
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment. . . shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services', 
(ii) medicines . •. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines ... provided under this chapter shall 
be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2005) (emphasis added). Moreover, § 34A-2-408 makes a 
further distinction between compensation and medical benefits by distinguishing when 
compensation is to be paid and when reimbursement for medical benefits and medicines 
are to be made. This section provides, in relevant part, 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (1) (b) and (2), compensation 
may not be allowed for the first three days after the injury is received. 
(b) The disbursements authorized in this chapter . . . for medical, nurse 
and hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses are payable 
for the first three days after the injury is received. 
(2) If the period of total temporary disability lasts more than 14 days, 
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compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is 
received. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-408 (2005) (emphasis added). 
Cleary, § 34A-2-105 does not apply to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is not attempting 
to recover compensation, but rather reimbursement for medical benefits and medicines; 
therefore, Plaintiff is not subjected to the exclusivity provision. 
None of the cases cited by Defendants relate to medical care nor medicines 
provided to injured workers. They all relate only to monetary compensation to be paid to 
the injured worker or their heirs, not reimbursement of medical care or medicines. 
Furthermore, the exclusivity provision of the Act only "bars common-law tort 
actions requiring proof of physical or mental injury" sustained on the job. Touchard v. 
La Z-Boy, Inc., 2006 UT 71, |24, 148 P.3d 945, 954 (citing Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird 
Corp., 2000 UT 94, [^19, 16 P.3d 555, 560-61). The claims brought by Plaintiff are not 
common-law tort claims and thus do not fall under the exclusivity provision of the Act. 
A. Defendant Has Made Contradictory Statements Regarding 
Plaintiffs Administrative Remedy. 
Throughout this case, Defendant has continually asserted that the Labor 
Commission is the proper forum to handle Plaintiffs complaint. However, in a separate 
case in front of the Utah Labor Commission for prescription claims incurred after May 1, 
2006, Defendant Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF") filed a Petition for Agency 
Declaratory Order to declare that Plaintiff is not a '"person providing goods or services 
described in subsections 34A-2-407(12)' of Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 2006), and is not, 
3 
therefore, entitled to file hearing applications pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 
(Supp. 2006)." See Workers' Compensation Fund's Petition for Agency Declaratory 
Order, attached hereto as "Exhibit A." 
Although Defendants assert that an administrative remedy is available to Plaintiff 
in this case, Defendant WCF is asserting the contrary in its Petition before the Labor 
Commission. By this Petition and this present case, Defendant WCF is preventing 
Plaintiff from accessing not only the judicial system but also the administrative system 
for prescription claims incurred after May 1, 2006. If the administrative remedies are not 
available to Plaintiff, then the judicial court system must be available for Plaintiff to 
adjudicate its claims for payment of goods and services provided to the injured workers. 
Otherwise, Plaintiff would be without a forum to adjudicate its valid and compensable 
claims, for which Defendants are statutorily responsible for paying. 
Defendants should not be permitted to argue that the Labor Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction over such claims and that administrative remedies are available to 
Plaintiff when those arguments are wholly contradictory with its position in the case 
presently in front of the Labor Commission. 
II. PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
In the alternative, if the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s private cause of action 
is upheld, then Plaintiff is entitled to its claim for unjust enrichment. 
The Labor Commission is not a court of equity, and as such, it does not have the 
power to exercise jurisdiction over claims that were not expressly or impliedly granted to 
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it by the state legislature. See Bevans v. Industrial Common of Utah, 790 P.2d 573, 576 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Even though Plaintiffs claim may relate to the Act, the Labor 
Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider an equitable claim. 
Moreover, such claim is not subjected to the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Act because it is not a basis for compensation under the Act. See Mounteer v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1991). The Act "relates to a diminution 
or loss of earning power caused by a physical or mental injury or by death sustained in 
the work place." Id. "They key to whether the [Act] precludes a common law right of 
action lies in the nature of the injury for which plaintiff makes claim, not the nature of 
defendant's act which plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that injury." Id. 
(citations omitted). Claims that involve proof of mental and physical harm would bar a 
common law claim. In contrast, unjust enrichment is a claim implied by law where the 
courts find that a remedy at law does not exist. American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI 
Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). Additionally, unjust enrichment does not 
relate to a diminution or loss of earning power caused by a physical or mental injury or 
by death sustained in the work place, nor does it require proof of physical or mental 
harm. Therefore, it is not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. 
Defendants alleged that Plaintiff does not have a valid claim for unjust enrichment 
because Plaintiff voluntarily paid the debts of another. Defendants, however, have not 
made any showing that Plaintiff is somehow a "voluntary payor." Nor has the Complaint 
plead any set of facts that would establish Plaintiff voluntarily paid off someone's debts. 
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Plaintiff did not officiously confer a benefit upon another, nor did it voluntarily pay the 
debt of another. But rather, Plaintiff took assignment of the pharmacies' workers 
compensation prescription claims and stepped into the shoes of the pharmacies. 
Defendants are then statutorily required to reimburse Plaintiffs for the medicines needed 
to treat their injured workers. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418(l). Defendants' 
argument is akin to barring any health care provider from ever seeking payment from an 
insurer. 
Defendants, in their brief, cited a few cases in which a voluntary payor of debt is 
not entitled to a claim for unjust enrichment. Those cases are easily distinguished from 
this case. In Southern Title Guarantee Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 
1988), the Court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to a claim for unjust enrichment 
because it received what it bargained for when it paid money to the defendants to receive 
a reconveyance of a particular parcel of land. Contrary to the plaintiff in Bethers, in the 
present case, Plaintiff never received what it bargained for. Plaintiff bargained for the 
ability to bill and collect on the claims from the carrier for the medicines provided to its 
injured employees. Plaintiff was able to bill the carrier, however, Defendants never paid 
the full amount of the invoice to which Plaintiff was legally entitled to. 
In Estate of Cleveland v. Gorden, 837 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tenn. App. 1992), the court 
did state that a "person who voluntarily and officiously pays another's debts is not 
entitled to reimbursement." However in that case, the court found that when the niece 
attempted to obtain reimbursement from her deceased aunt's estate for medical and other 
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expenditures made on behalf of her aunt, she was entitled to be reimbursed for those 
expenses because she was acting out of a moral obligation, she did not intend those 
expenses to be a gift, and the aunt knew that the niece expected to be reimbursed. 
Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff paid the pharmacies based on a contractual obligation; 
Plaintiff did not intend the payments to be a gift, especially when it was expending time 
and money in collecting on the prescription claims from the carrier; and Defendants knew 
that Plaintiff expected to be reimbursed for those services because of Plaintiff s invoices 
and collection attempts. Plaintiff did not voluntarily and officiously pay the debt of 
another. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for the full amount of the 
services that it provided. 
Although Defendants argue that a volunteer is not entitled to a claim for unjust 
enrichment, Defendants have failed to define a "volunteer." In State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 
1996), the Court adopted the Tenth Circuit's determination as to when a person or entity 
is a volunteer. The Court stated that a "payment is not voluntary if it is made with a 
reasonable or good faith belief in an obligation or personal interest in making that 
payment." IdL at 986 (quoting Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 
1987)). The Court held that State Farm was not a volunteer because it had a legal interest 
of its own to protect when it investigated and settled insurance claims. Similarly, in this 
present case, Plaintiff clearly is not a volunteer because it had a contract with the 
pharmacies to receive assignment of their workers' compensation prescription claims. 
Plaintiff made those payments to the pharmacies because it had a contractual obligation 
to do so and to protect its own legal interests under that agreement. 
In Bingham v. Walker Bros., Bank, 283 P. 1055, 1064 (Utah 1929), the Court 
found that the defendant was not entitled to subrogation for the debts he paid on behalf of 
the decedent, Elias Crane, because the purported settlement agreement entered into 
between the defendant and Crane's widow was void since she did not have authority to 
act on behalf of Crane's estate. The Court stated that it "always requires something more 
than payment of the debt in order to entitle the person paying to be substituted in place of 
the original creditor." Id. In this case, there is something more that entitles Plaintiff to be 
substituted in place of the pharmacies. That something is a valid and enforceable 
agreement with the pharmacies, whereby the pharmacies assigned their right to bill and 
collect on the workers' compensation prescription claims to Plaintiff in addition to the 
electronic adjudication system that Plaintiff provides to pharmacies that allows them to 
fill prescriptions for injured workers without requiring the injured workers to pay cash 
out-of-pocket. Plaintiff has paid the debts of Defendants, not as a volunteer, but based on 
an obligation to do so. Since Plaintiff stepped into the shoes of the pharmacy, it was 
legally entitled to reimbursement from Defendants. Therefore, Defendants cannot avoid 
their obligation under the Act by claiming that Plaintiff is a mere volunteer. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling and order to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint and remand the case for trial. 
Dated this _/X day of June, 2007. 
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February 20, 2007 
Joyce A. Sewell, Director 
Industrial Accidents 
Labor Commission 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Ms. Sewell: 
Enclosed you will find a Petition for Agency Declaratory Order filed on behalf of 
the Workers Compensation Fund. I have mailed a copy of this Petition to Working RX, 
Inc., who I believe to be a party who is entitled to intervene in connection with this matter. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley 
MDE/gm 
Enclosure 
cc: Cynthia Daniels 
Rex Huang 
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175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
Attorney for Workers Compensation Fund 
IN THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR AGENCY 
DECLARATORY ORDER 
Case No. 
The Workers Compensation Fund hereby petitions the Labor Commission for a 
declaratory order indicating the company Working RX, Inc. is not a "person providing 
goods or services described in subsections 34A-2-407(12)n of Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 
2006), and is not, therefore, entitled to file hearing applications pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, § 34A-2-801 (Supp. 2006). 
The facts giving rise to this petition are that Working RX, Inc. has filed a number of 
hearing applications claiming to have provided prescription medications to employees of the 
petitioner's insureds. In reality, Working RX has paid pharmacies for the medicines 
provided to the employees and now seeks to recover from the petitioner amounts in excess 
of what it has paid to the pharmacies for such medicines. 
Working RX, Inc., cannot qualify as a person providing medicines, not only because 
it does not in fact do so, but also because dispensing medicines requires a pharmacist or 
PRINCE, YEATES 
6 GELDZAHLER 
7 Centre!, Suite 900 
75 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
(801)524-1000 
pharmacy license. See Utah Code Ann, §§ 58-17b-301 and 303 (Supp. 2006). Anyone 
"selling, dispensing, or otherwise trafficking in prescription drugs" without a license is 
guilty of unlawful conduct, specifically a third degree felony. See Utah Code Ann, §§ 58-
17b-501(ll) and 504(1) (Supp. 2006). 
Thus, only the dispensing pharmacy would have standing to bring an action like this 
to argue the inadequacy of reimbursement amounts. 
Petitioner requests a declaration that a person providing medicines must be a 
licensed pharmacy or pharmacist to meet the statutory definition of who can file an 
application for a hearing. 
DATED Ms2fi^L day of February, 2007. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By 7*7. 4f*jiJ C{A/AJL 
M. David Eckersley ^ / 
Attorney for Workers Compensation Fund 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the lb ^day of pcfyfTWl/ , 2007, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Agency Declaratory Order to be mailed, 
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Rex H. Huang 
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4225 Lake Park Blvd., Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84120 
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